Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for Nanoscale
  Communication Systems Operating in THz Band by Aman, Waqas et al.
Securing the Insecure: A First-Line-of-Defense for
Nanoscale Communication Systems Operating in
THz Band
Waqas Aman∗†, M. Mahboob Ur Rahman∗, Hassan T. Abbas†, Muhammad Arslan Khalid⊥, Muhammad A. Imran†,
Akram Alomainy††, and Qammer H. Abbasi†
∗ Electrical Engineering Department, Information Technology University, Lahore, 54000, Pakistan
†Department of Electronics and Nano Engineering, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK
⊥Division of Biomedical Engineering, School of Engineering, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK
††School of Electronic Engineering and Computer science, Queen Mary University of London, London, E1 4NS, UK
∗{waqas.aman, mahboob.rahman}@itu.edu.pk, †{Hassan.Abbas, Muhammas.Imran, Qammer. Abbasi}@glasgow.ac.uk,
⊥arslan.k@live.com, ††a.alomainy@qmul.ac.uk
Abstract—Nanoscale communication systems operating in Ter-
ahertz (THz) band are anticipated to revolutionise the healthcare
systems of the future. Global wireless data traffic is undergoing
a rapid growth. However, wireless systems, due to their broad-
casting nature, are vulnerable to malicious security breaches. In
addition, advances in quantum computing poses a risk to existing
crypto-based information security. It is of the utmost importance
to make the THz systems resilient to potential active and passive
attacks which may lead to devastating consequences, especially
when handling sensitive patient data in healthcare systems. New
strategies are needed to analyse these malicious attacks and to
propose viable countermeasures. In this manuscript, we present
a new authentication mechanism for nanoscale communication
systems operating in THz band at the physical layer. We assessed
an impersonation attack on a THz system. We propose using
path loss as a fingerprint to conduct authentication via two-step
hypothesis testing for a transmission device. We used hidden
Markov Model (HMM) viterbi algorithm to enhance the output
of hypothesis testing. We also conducted transmitter identification
using maximum likelihood and Gaussian mixture model (GMM)
expectation maximization algorithms. Our simulations showed
that the error probabilities are a decreasing functions of SNR. At
10 dB with 0.2 false alarm, the detection probability was almost
one. We further observed that HMM out-performs hypothesis
testing at low SNR regime (10% increase in accuracy is recorded
at SNR = 5 dB) whereas the GMM is useful when ground
truths are noisy. Our work addresses major security gaps faced
by communication system either through malicious breaches
or quantum computing, enabling new applications of nanoscale
systems for Industry 4.0.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent developments in the nano fabrication technolo-
gies has led to an increased interest in the design of nanoscale
communication systems where small devices (of size few nm)
that are few millimeter apart from each other communicate
to each other [1]. Due to their small size, the existing frame-
works, techniques and methods proposed for communication
networks such as Wifi, 4G etc. are not suitable for exchanging
information amongst the nano devices [2]. For instance, nano
devices are unable to operate at microwave bands due to
their small size. They will require molecular communication
and Terahertz (THz) band for operation [2]. Additionally, in
IoT devices, due to small energy sources, the computational
processing capability is limited. Therefore, it is necessary to
meet the requirements for new protocols of nano devices at
all layers of protocol stack. Operating in the THz band (0.1
- 10 THz) is a promising solution at the physical layer (PL)
[3] which makes the antenna size very small and thus suitable
for exchanging information between nano devices. Potential
applications of nanoscale communication in THz band include
environmental monitoring, precision agriculture, smart health
care and to name a few [4].
Like other communication networks the nanoscale com-
munication networks are also prone to a wide range of
active and passive attacks by adversaries [5]. Some of the
common attacks include eavesdropping, impersonation, Denial
of Services (DoS) etc. Here we investigate an impersonation
attack in nanoscale communication networks. Figure 1 shows
an illustration of a scenario of impersonation attack on a
smart healthcare system. The nano nodes are deployed inside
or on the body of a person for diseases diagnostics or to
remotely monitor their health parameters. These nano devices
are connected to a nano router which communicates the data to
an outdoor network via a nano to micro interface. Assuming,
an enemy of the person, secretly deployed its own nano nodes
nearby with the aim of impersonating person’s legal nodes to
report false measurements to the remote monitoring system, an
incorrect response through nano machines or nearby doctors
could result in devastating consequences. Therefore, we need
an authentication mechanism at the nano router to allow data
transmission i.e. health measurements from legal nodes only,
blocking all malicious nodes.
In traditional communication systems, the countermeasures
for such attacks were made at the higher layer using cryptog-
raphy. Despite the wide work in the field of cryptography,
the mechanism can be compromised because of its solely
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Fig. 1: An envisioned future nano-scale healthcare system with possible malicious nodes.
dependency on the predefined shared secret among the legal
users. With recent advances in quantum computing, the tra-
ditional encryption become vulnerable to be easily decoded
and existing crypto-based measures are not quantum secure
unless the size of secret key increases to impractical length
[6]. In this regard, physical layer (PL) security finds itself a
promising mechanism in future communication systems. PL
security exploits the random nature of physical medium/layer
for security purposes [7].
Authentication is one of the pillars required for the security of
any communication system. PL authentication is a systematic
procedure that uses PL’s features to provide authentication.
In conventional systems, asymmetric key encryption (AKE)
is typically used in the authentication phase which is the
realm of public key encryption (a crypto based approach).
Such schemes are quantum insecure and incur overhead or
high computations which not only increase the size of the
device but also consume high power. The devices fabricated
for nanoscale communication are energy constrained as they
comprise a small source of energy (battery). PL authentication
has a low overhead (simple procedure which typically includes
feature estimation and testing) and is almost impossible to
clone unless the devices lie on each other. Various fingerprints
including RSS [8], CIR [9] [10], CFR [11] [12], carrier
frequency offset [13] [14], I/Q imbalance [15] are reported for
PL authentication in conventional communication systems.
Regarding security of systems operating in THz band, we
found two works [5] [16] in the literature. The experimental
work of Jianjun et al. [5] for the first time rejected the claim
about security in THz band. The claim was that the inherit
narrow beamwidth of THz link makes it secure and thus im-
possible for a malicious node to accomplish an eavesdropping
attack. A similar claim is also made for beyond the THz band
[17]. The authors in [5] their experiments used reflectors of
different shapes between THz transmitter and receiver. Then
with the help of secrecy capacity and blockage as performance
metrics, they clearly demonstrated that eavesdropping attack in
THz can easily be done.The work considered an eavesdropping
attack in a system operating in THz band which is different
than the attack we consider in this work. In our previous work
[16], we studied PL authentication for an in-vivo nanoscale
communication system whereby we utilized the path loss
as the device fingerprint for three nodes system (i.e. Alice,
Eve and Bob). Our previous work [16] was limited to three
nodes system only. In this manuscript, we extend our previous
work by studying the authentication of a generic system,
comprising multiple legal and malicious nodes, operating in
the THz band. We exploit the high-resolution transmission
molecular absorption (HITRAN) [18] data base for computing
the path loss. We perform authentication by hypothesis testing.
We refine the output of hypothesis testing via the hidden
Markov model (HMM) viterbi algorithm. We also perform
transmitter identification via the maximum likelihood and
Gaussian mixture model (GMM) expectation maximization
algorithm.
Outline. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides system model. Section III discusses authen-
tication via two-step hypothesis testing. Section IV presents
hidden markov model to refine the output of hypothesis testing.
Section V provides transmitter identification schemes. Section
VI presents simulation results with discussions and Section
VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
For the purpose of simulation, we considered a square
2D map/layout of size (1 m ×1 m) where M + N nano
transmission (Tx) nodes, M Alice (Legal) nodes {Ai}Mi=1 and
N Eve (Malicous) nodes {Ej}Nj=1, deployed according to the
uniform distribution model, whilst a nano router/receiver node,
Bob, is placed at origin as shown in Fig. 2. We assume that the
Tx nodes transmits with a fixed/pre-specified transmit power
so that the path loss can be computed by Bob.
The path loss is given as [19], [20]:
L(f, d)[dB] = La(f, d)[dB] + Ls(f, d)[dB] (1)
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Fig. 2: The system model: Bob is placed at origin. Alice and Eve nodes’
locations are modelled as uniformly distributed random variables. In this case,
M = 10, N = 10.
where f is the frequency, d is the distance, La(f, d)[dB]
is the absorption loss, and Ls(f, d)[dB] is the spreading loss.
The spreading loss is given as
Ls(f, d)[dB] = 20 log10(
4pifd
c
), (2)
where c is the speed of light. The absorption loss is given as:
La(f, d) =
1
τ(f, d)
(3)
where τ represents the transmittance of the signal and is given
by Beer-Lambart law:
τ(f, d) = e−k(f)d (4)
where k is the medium absorption coefficient, given as:
k(f) =
∑
i,g
ki,g(f) (5)
where
ki,g(f) =
p
p0
T0
T
Qi,gσi,g(f) (6)
where i is the isotopologue (molecule that differs in isotropic
composition) and g is gas, p0(T0) are standard pressure
(Temperature), σi,g(f) is the absorption cross-section and Qi,g
is the molecular density given by
Qi,g =
n
V
qi,gNA =
p
RT
qi,gNA (7)
where R is gas constant, NA is the Avogadro constant and qi,g
is the mixing ration for i of g. The absorption cross-section
can be expressed as
σi,g = Si,gGi,g(f) (8)
where, the line intensity Si,g and line shape Gi,g(f) parame-
ters can be computed using data from HITRAN database [18]
III. AUTHENTICATION VIA TWO-STEP HYPOTHESIS
TESTING
We assume that the shared channel is time-slotted, whilst the
transmit nodes perform channel sensing before transmitting,
hence there are no collisions. Without the loss of generality, it
can be assumed that Ai is the legitimate user for the slot k, but
if Ai doesn’t transmit during this time-slot, Ej could transmit
to Bob pretending to be an Alice node. Therefore, Bob needs
to authenticate each message received on the shared channel
and verify the transmitter identity (if no impersonation has
been declared) in a systematic manner.
Assuming that the noisy measurement z(k) = L + n(k)
has been obtained at time k (for instance, by using the pulse
based method as discussed in [21]), where n(k) ∼ N(0, σ2)
and L is the path loss. Furthermore, in line with previous
studies [16], [22], we assume that Bob has already learnt
the ground truth via prior training on a secure channel. The
ground truth vector can be denoted by l = {L1, ..., LM}T . The
maximum likelihood (ML) hypothesis test can be explained by
the following equation:
(T ∗, i∗) = min
i
|z − Li| (9)
Next, the binary hypothesis test works as follows:H0(no impersonation) : T
∗ = min
i
|z(k)− Li| < 
H1(impersonation) : T ∗ = min
i
|z(k)− Li| > 
(10)
Equivalently, we have:
T ∗ ≷H1H0  (11)
where  is a small threshold - a design parameter. This work
follows the Neyman-Pearson theorem [23] which states that,
for a pre-specified Pfa,  can be chosen such that Pmd is
minimized.
The error probabilities for the above hypothesis tests are:
Pfa = P (H1|H0) =
M∑
i=1
P (T ∗ > |Ai)pi(i)
=
M∑
i=1
2Q(

σ
)pi(i) = 2Q(

σ
)
M∑
i=1
pi(i) = 2Q(

σ
)
(12)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e
−t2
2 dt is the complementary cu-
mulative distribution function (CCDF) of a standard normal
distribution, and pi(i) is the prior probability of Ai. Thus, the
threshold could be computed as follows:
 = σQ−1(
Pfa
2
) (13)
Then, Pmd is given as:
Pmd = P (H0|H1) = P (T ∗ < |H1)
=
N∑
j=1
M∑
i=1
[
Q(
Li − Lj − 
σ
)−Q(Li − Lj + 
σ
)
]
pi(j)
(14)
where pi(j) =
∑M
i=1 αijpi(i) is the prior probability of Ej .
0 < αij < 1 is the fraction of slots which are originally
dedicated to Ai but are found idle and thus utilized by Ej .
Since Pmd is an R.V., the expected value P¯md := E(Pmd)
is as follows:
P¯md =
N∑
j=1
1
∆
pi(j).
(∫ Lmax
Lmin
M∑
i=1
Q(
Li − L(E)j − 
σ
)−Q(Li − L
(E)
j + 
σ
)dL
(E)
j
)
=
N∑
j=1
1
∆
pi(j).
(∫ Lmax
Lmin
M∑
i=1
Q(
Li − L(E) − 
σ
)−Q(Li − L
(E) + 
σ
)dL(E)
)
(15)
where we have assumed that the unknown path loss Lj ∼
U(Lmin, Lmax) ∀j, and ∆ = Lmax − Lmin.
IV. HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL BASED APPROACH
At a given time instant k, the system is in one of the
two states with the state-space: S = {s0, s1}. The states s0
and s1 imply that there is no impersonation, impersonation
respectively at time k. However, the true state of the system is
hidden; therefore, what we observe through the hypothesis test
is another observable Markov chain. The connection between
the true/hidden state and the observable state is given by the
emission probability matrix:
R =
[
r0,0 r0,1
r1,0 r1,1
]
(16)
where ri,j = Pr(x[k] = i|s[k] = j), i, j ∈ {0, 1}. The off-
diagonal elements in the i-th row of R represents the errors
made by the ML test, i.e., deciding the state as s[k] = j,
j ∈ {0, 1} \ i while the system was actually in state s[k] = i.
The transition from state i to state j occurs after a fixed
interval of T = tk− tk−1 seconds where 1/T is the measure-
ment rate. Assuming that the system was in state s0 at time
k = 0, i.e. x[0] = [1, 0]T and we are in time k − 1 and we
want to predict the probability vector x[k] at time k and the
system is in state si, i ∈ {0, 1}. To this end, we have the
following transition probability matrix:
P =
[
p0,0 p0,1
p1,0 p1,1
]
(17)
where pi,j = P (x[k] = j|x[k − 1] = i), i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Then,
we have the following relation: x[k] = Pkx[0]. Alternatively,
we can write: x[k] = Px[k − 1].
A. ML Estimation of a Hidden Markov Sequence using Viterbi
Algorithm
Viterbi algorithm is used for ML sequence estimation
(MLSE) of {s[k]}Kk=1, given {x[k]}Kk=1 as:
{s[k]} = arg max
{s′ [k]}
p(x[k]|s′ [k]) (18)
V. TRANSMITTER IDENTIFICATION
The probability of misclassification error resulting from Eq.
9 is given as:
Pmc =
M∑
i=1
Pmc|i.pi(i) (19)
where Pmc|i = P (Bob decides Aj |Ai was the sender). For
the hypothesis test of (11), Pmc|i is given as:
Pmc|i = 1−
(
Q(
L˜l,i − L˜i
σ
)−Q( L˜u,i − L˜i
σ
)
)
(20)
where L˜l,i =
L˜i−1+L˜i
2 , L˜u,i =
L˜i+L˜i+1
2 . Additionally, l˜ =
{L˜1, ..., L˜M} = sort(l) where sort operation (.) sorts a vector
in an increasing order. For the boundary cases, e.g., i = 1, i =
M , L˜l,1 = Lmin, L˜l,M = Lmax respectively.
A. Transmitter Identification using Gaussian Mixture Mod-
elling
The GMM was consisted of Q = M +N component den-
sities where only the Q = M densities could be trained. The
3Q GMM parameters was learnt by running the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm on the training data. GMM, in
its standard form, is perfectly suited for transmitter identifica-
tion. Under GMM, the probability density function (pdf) of the
(observed) mixture random variable X is the convex/weighted
sum of the component pdfs:
fX(x) =
Q∑
q=1
piqφq(x) (21)
where each φq(x) is a Gaussian pdf which satisfies: φq(x) ≥
0,
∫
x∈R φq(x)dx = 1. The weights/priors satisfy: piq(x) ≥ 0,∑Q
q=1 piq = 1.
The GMM has 3Q unknown parameters which were learnt
by applying the iterative Expectation-Maximization algorithm
on training data {xm}Mm=1. The posterior probability for each
point xm in the training data (i.e., the likelihood of xm
belonging to component q of the mixture) was computed as
follows (j is the iteration number):
p(j)m,q =
pi
(j)
q φq(xm, µ
(j)
q ,Σ
(j)
q )∑Q
qˆ=1 pi
(j)
qˆ φ(xm, µ
(j)
qˆ ,Σ
(j)
qˆ )
(22)
The Q number of priors were updated as follows:
pi(j+1)q =
1
M
M∑
m=1
p(j)m,q (23)
The Q number of means were updated as follows:
µ(j+1)q =
∑M
m=1 p
(j)
m,qxm∑M
m=1 p
(j)
m,q
(24)
The Q number of (co-)variances were updated as follows:
Σ(j+1)q =
∑M
m=1 p
(j)
m,q(xm − µ(j)q )(xm − µ(j)q )T∑M
m=1 p
(j)
m,q
(25)
The iterative EM algorithm monotonically increased the ob-
jective (likelihood) function value, and converged when the
increase in likelihood function value between two successive
iterations became less than the threshold .
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We kept M = N = 10, αij = 0.5 ∀j, f = 1 THz, T = 285
k and p = 1 atm. Both Alice and Eve nodes were deployed
according to uniform distribution in 1m× 1m area. Total 105
random realisations (independent for Alice and Eve nodes) of
nodes’ deployment were taken and then errors were averaged
over the realizations.
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Fig. 3: The error probabilities against the SNR 1
σ2
Pfa and Pmd are two well-known probabilities resulting
in hypothesis testing. The Pfa was defined as the probability
that any i−th Alice node can be considered as any of the Eve
nodes. While the Pmd is the probability of the event that any
j−th Eve node can be considered as any of the Alice nodes.
Fig. 3 represents the two probabilities against the SNR
= 1σ2 where the improvement in error probabilities with an
increasing SNR can be seen clearly. The designed parameter
 decreases Pmd but increases Pfa.
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Fig. 4: Performance comparison of HT and HMM.
Fig. 4 shows the efficacy of HMM. At low SNR the perfor-
mance of HMM was far better than HT and at high SNR HT
was closed to HMM. The results were produced after monte
carlo based simulation. The total number of transmissions were
kept to 105 (more specifically, 105 binary states (s0, s1) were
generated),  = 1, P = 0.5I2×2, where I is the identity matrix
and K = 103. The error resulting from HT and HMM methods
were calculated as the number of times the predicted/estimated
state was not equal to actual state divided by total trans-
missions. The accuracy was then computed accordingly. The
entries of R were calculated according to Pfa and Pmd. Fig.
5 shows the Receiver Operating characteristic (ROC) curves
for different configurations of node and transmissions from
Eve nodes (i.e. αij). Typically, the ROC contains two error
probabilities (Pd and Pfa), but due to multiple nodes in this
study, we had three probabilities. For any Pfa value the Pmc
was constant which was obvious from Eq.20. Increasing SNR
not only improved Pd but also improved Pmc as well. The
Pfa was chosen as an independent variable and swept on the
range 0 to 1. Using Eq. 13, the threshold was calculated for
a given SNR value. Further, Pd = 1 − Pmd (the detection
probability) and Pmc were computed as average after doing
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Pfa
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P d
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P m
c
+ SNR = 0 dB
o SNR = 10 dB
 SNR = 20 dB
(a) M = N = 10 αij = 0.5 ∀j
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Pfa
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P d
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P m
c
+ SNR = 0 dB
o SNR = 10 dB
 SNR = 20 dB
(b) M = N = 20 αij = 0.5 ∀j
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Pfa
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P d
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P m
c
+ SNR = 0 dB
o SNR = 10 dB
 SNR = 20 dB
(c) M = N = 10 αij = 0.25 ∀j
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Pfa
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P d
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P m
c
+ SNR = 0 dB
o SNR = 10 dB
 SNR = 20 dB
(d) M = N = 20 αij = 0.25 ∀j
Fig. 5: ROC curves
105 uniform realisations of nodes deployment. We observed
that increasing the number of nodes does not affect the Pd
but Pmc increases with an increase in number of Alice nodes
(M ). We further observed that the less the nodes (Alice nodes)
remain idle during their allocated slot the more the Pd we had.
Pmc is the probability of deciding i−th Alice node, as any
Alice node without i. Pmc becomes an important metric when
dealing with multiple nodes’ identification. Here, Pmc resulted
from both transmitter identification’s algorithms (ML which is
a bi-product of two-step HT based authentication and GMM).
As GMM is a learning approach, it requires training data to
learn its parameters. That is the reason that we only performed
transmitter identification using GMM. We assumed no data
was available for Eve nodes.
Fig. 6 (a) was generated by assuming actual ground truths
(noiseless (Li ∀i)) of Alice nodes available for performing ML
based transmitter identification. The ML was implemented us-
ing Eq.9 with having noiseless ground truths. Fig. 6 (a) shows
that the two approaches perform equally. To test the efficacy
of the GMM approach, we performed another experiment and
plotted the results in Fig. 6 (b). This time we assumed that
the ground truths of Alice nodes were noisy Li + n ∀i (i.e
when the ground truths were obtained on secure channel it
also included noise or an error). This time the the ML based
approach was implemented using Eq.9 to include noisy ground
truths. The GMM parameters were estimated on 104 training
data generated from the legal nodes and then tested on 105.
The error was calculated as number of times the estimated
state was not equal to the actual value divided by the total
transmissions for both approaches and for both cases. We
observed from Fig. 6 (b) that the overall performance of GMM
was improved. The performance improved even further for
lower SNR or higher σ2.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper provided an authentication mechanism using
path loss as a fingerprint at the physical layer in nanoscale
communication systems operating in terahertz band. The
work’s importance was advocated by illustrating envisioned
smart healthcare application of nanoscale communication sys-
tems. The complex and quantum insecure crypto measures can
be complemented using this approach which is simple and
quantum secure (i.e. no encryption or shared secret key is
involved). This was observed from ROC curves after doing
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
P m
c
ML
GMM
(a) Noiseless ground truths
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
P m
c
(b) Nosiy ground truths
Fig. 6: Pmc vs estimation error σ2.
monte carlo based simulation for nodes deployment under
uniform distribution that with 20% false rate the detection
probability is almost one when operating with SNR = 10
dB. A generic system was considered comprising multiple
legal and malicious nano nodes operating in Terahetrz band.
Specifically, for simulation purpose, nodes were deployed
in 1m × 1m area under uniform distribution and air was
considered as a medium among the nodes and path loss was
calculated using HITRAN data base.
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